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There is increasing momentum behind the push from researchers, 
policymakers, and practitioners to broaden and deepen data production 
and analysis in indigent defense.  One important force driving that 
momentum is the widespread belief that improving the dismal state of 
indigent defense requires shoring up accountability in the field, and that 
a data-rich environment will be an accountability-rich environment.  
This essay interrogates and problematizes the data-accountability 
connection in indigent defense.  Identifying the multiple and layered 
accountability relationships and types that can and do exist in indigent 
defense, and considering the varieties of data production and usage that 
could be taken up by defenders, reveals that the premise of a direct, 
positive relationship between the two is misguided.  Indeed, there are 
risks of perverse consequences for accountability from data-driven 
indigent defense decision-making, particularly to the extent that 
quantitative capacity might empower accounters that lack incentive to 
maximize defense quality.  Ultimately, the essay aims not to undermine 
the data project or its accountability aspects, but to encourage attention 
to these risks in research and in institutional design.   
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no shortage of ailments afflicting the provision of indigent defense in 
the United States.  The system, if the national “patchwork” of mechanisms for 
providing counsel to poor criminal defendants can be called that,
1
 is widely 
understood to be underfunded, overburdened, and undervalued by the public and 
the lawmakers with the power to change the status quo.
2
  What’s more, the 
                                                                                                                                      
*   Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.  For incisive and helpful comments 
on earlier drafts, many thanks to Andy Davies, Ward Farnsworth, Andrea Marsh, Janet Moore, Dan 
Richman, and participants in the University of Cincinnati College of Law, University of Texas 
School of Law, and University of Alabama faculty workshops.  For fabulous editorial assistance, 
thanks to the editors and staff of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law. 
1   Alissa Pollitz Worden et al., A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process, and Public 
Defense Across American States, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1423 (2010). 
2   See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing 
on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 YALE L.J. 2604, 2606 (2013) (describing consensus). 
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conditions generating these critiques have a depressingly long lineage.  As Sara 
Mayeux’s recent historical treatment illuminates, “[c]haracteristics now identified 
as symptoms of crisis—such as inadequate funding, ever-expanding caseloads, and 
triage advocacy oriented around pleas instead of trials—first appeared as lawyers 
began to implement the transition to large-scale indigent defense that they thought 
Gideon required.”3  
But amidst the old news about the woes of indigent defense is some 
(comparatively) new news about the roots of these problems—namely, deficits in 
accountability and data.  Piggybacking on broader contemporary trends in 
governance and public administration (among other fields),
4
 the need to enhance 
“accountability” for the provision of indigent defense services is persistently 
identified as a top priority for mending the system.  An array of taskforces and 
commissions have reached this conclusion in reviewing beleaguered state or local 
systems from Las Vegas to Louisiana and points in between.
5
  Calls for 
“accountability” for the provision of indigent defense are increasingly heard from 
both reform advocates and actors within the system.
6
  As the director of the federal 
                                                                                                                                      
3   Sara Mayeux, What Gideon Did, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 15, 24 (2016). 
4   See, e.g., Mark Bovens et al., Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 3–6 (Mark Bovens et al. eds., 2014); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-
Bureaucratic Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: 
DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006); Wendy Nelson Espeland & 
Berit Irene Vannebo, Accountability, Quantification, and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 21, 23 
(2007). 
5   See, e.g., SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN UTAH: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
TRIAL-LEVEL INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (2015), http://sixthamendment.org/6ac/6AC_utahreport.
pdf [https://perma.cc/LM3S-FX2X] (discussing lack of accountability as central failure of Utah’s 
indigent defense system); COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO THE 
CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (2006), http://nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-commission/
IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7BG-ENPA] (same in New York); 
NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, EVALUATION OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE: CLARK COUNTY, 
NEVADA (2003), http://docplayer.net/794104-Evaluation-of-the-public-defender-office-clark-county-
nevada-march-2003.html [https://perma.cc/N59W-35WN] (same for Clark County); REPORT OF THE 
GEORGIA SUPREME COURT INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION 3–5 (2000), https://www.schr.org/files/
post/media/Blue%20Ribbon%20Commission%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6T8Y-UTEZ] (same 
for Georgia); AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
EQUAL JUSTICE 4, 39 (2004) (including as one of nine main findings of national review that 
“[i]ndigent defense systems frequently lack basic oversight and accountability, impairing the 
provision of uniform, quality services.”).  
6   See, e.g., Tim Evans, Gideon’s Promise Often Broken, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 18, 2013, 
at A6 (quoting head of Indiana Public Defense Council who stated that “[t]he most significant issues 
facing indigent defense services in Indiana are the lack of adequate funding and the lack of oversight 
and accountability for the quality of services provided”); SMART ON CRIME COAL., SMART ON CRIME: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS (2011), http://www.constitutionproject
.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/SmartOnCrime_Complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MGC-Z72L]; 
N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING INDIGENT DEFENSE (2007), 
http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/News_Updates_Products/RoundTableRepo
rt_06_08.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UPF-98MZ]; ACLU OF WASH., The Unfulfilled Promise of Gideon 1, 
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Office for Access to Justice put the matter at a recent celebration of Texas’s 
indigent defense reform legislation, “[s]tatewide standards, state funding, 
transparency, [and] accountability . . . are the necessary prerequisites for an 
indigent defense system that lives up to Gideon’s promise of equal justice for all 
regardless of one’s economic station in life.”7  If accountability is currently a 
“fashionable concept” in law and public administration,8 the field of indigent 
defense is more stylish than ever. 
Coinciding with, and both fueling and fueled by accountability-speak, is a 
broad-based push to render the provision and management of indigent defense a 
more data-driven enterprise.
9
  Indeed, it is fair to say that the field has been, until 
quite recently, a veritable data desert: Seemingly basic information like how many 
cases a state-provided attorney is carrying, how many hours the attorney has 
worked on a given case, and what outcomes the attorney achieved, is unknown or 
nigh impossible to know in many jurisdictions.
10
  And so, in its more modest 
manifestations, the trend toward data is exemplified by the increased push by 
                                                                                                                                                   
5, 13 (2004), https://aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/media-legacy/attachments/Unfulfilled%20Promise
%20of%20Gideon.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E4N-APWV]; TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEF. PROJECT, THE 
FAIR DEFENSE REPORT: ANALYSIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PRACTICES IN TEXAS (2000), https://www.
texasappleseed.org/sites/default/files/184-FairDefenseAct-AppleseedAnalysisReport.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SS4K-K7GE] (same in Texas). 
7   Lisa Foster, Director, Office for Access to Justice Delivers, Remarks at the Texas Fair 
Defense Act 15th Anniversary Symposium Celebration (May 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/director-lisa-foster-office-access-justice-delivers-remarks-texas-fair-defense-act-15th 
[https://perma.cc/6TEF-KCGE]. 
8   Rubin, supra note 4, at 52. 
9   I use the term “data” in what I take to be its most capacious sense—simply information that 
is susceptible to analysis in some form.  See, e.g., Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (“factual 
information (as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for reasoning, discussion, or calculation”).  
My terminology encompasses both quantitative and qualitative data, though the relative value of each 
is a contentious matter among researchers.  Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, 
and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 264–67 (1996) (discussing necessity for cost-
benefit analysis to include both quantitative and qualitative data, and difficulty of identifying quality 
qualitative information).  Additionally, bucking strict grammar rules in favor of common usage, I will 
treat the word “data” as a singular noun regardless of whether I refer to one “datum” or many.  
10   See Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based 
Practice in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 334–35 (2015); Class Action Complaint 
for Declaratory Relief at 5, Remick v. Utah, No. 160903921 (June 21, 2016) [hereinafter Remick 
Complaint] (alleging that in Utah “there is no practical way for an independent observer to efficiently 
determine crucial facts such as: the number of cases assigned to a particular public defender; the 
available resources for public defenders; or the number of trials or contested motions or hearings 
involving indigent defendants”); Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, Phillips v. California, No. 15 CE CG 02201 (July 14, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/file_stamped_phillips_v_state_of_california_
complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8VT-WQ89] (alleging that “in response to Public Records Act 
requests the County maintains that it does not have records that accurately reflect individual public 
defenders’ caseloads”; public defender office records permit only an estimate). 
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indigent defense advocates, including both reformers as well as, to some extent, 
defenders themselves, to collect and analyze information about case assignments, 
lawyer time, case outcomes, and other basic attorney—and organization-level 
performance measures.
11
  The aim is simply to render the defender environment 
more knowable and known.  For reformers, such as lawyers who have sued for 
improved defender systems in New York, Idaho, and elsewhere, data in hand 
converts anecdotes about an over-burdened system into a statistical account of 
caseload stress, and suboptimal work output.
12
  For defenders themselves, hard 
facts about caseloads, work performed, and results achieved facilitate quality 
improvement and management decisions, and might aid in perennial funding 
requests.
13
 
More ambitiously, the trend is seen in the call by thought leaders in the field, 
as well as the federal government, to subject attorney performance and case 
outcomes to more rigorous statistical analysis, permitting granular assessment of 
the links (or lack thereof) between individual and systemic inputs and outputs.
14
  
Taking a page from the playbooks of other professions, and other sectors of the 
criminal justice system, the aim among these proponents is to achieve “evidence-
based practice” in the field of indigent defense, permitting development of 
                                                                                                                                      
11  See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-32-803 & 804 (codifying law passed in 2016 creating 
new Utah indigent defense commissions, and requiring data collection and staffing with a data 
analyst); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-850 (requiring that the Idaho public defense commission promulgate 
rules on data collection); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.989(1)(g) & 780.993(1) (authorizing, as of 
2013, Michigan Indigent Defense Commission to collect data on operation of indigent defense 
statewide); see N.Y. EXEC. L. §§ 832–33 (creating indigent defense board with data collection 
mandate); MAREA BEEMAN, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, BASIC DATA EVERY DEFENDER 
PROGRAM NEEDS TO TRACK: A TOOLKIT FOR DEFENDER LEADERS 5–7 (2014), http://www.
nlada.org/sites/default/files/pictures/BASIC%20DATA%20TOOLKIT%2010-27-14%20Web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WL93-6LGY].  
12  See generally Amended Class Action Complaint, Hurrell-Harring v. New York, No. 8866-
07 (Apr. 28, 2008), http://www.nyclu.org/files/Amended%20Class%20Action%20Complaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/G6YC-ENZR]; Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, 
Tucker v. Idaho, No. CV-2015-10240, https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu
idahopubdefensecomplaintfilestamp-sm.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNZ9-ZZLX]. 
13   See BEEMAN, supra note 11, at 5. 
14  See About the Initiative: Turning Principles into Practice, SMART DEFENSE, http://smart
defenseinitiative.org [https://perma.cc/CWH7-EBAR] (“The Smart Defense Initiative is part of the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Smart Suite of criminal justice programs that include Smart 
Pretrial, Smart Policing, Smart Supervision, and Smart Prosecution.  The Smart Suite supports 
criminal justice professionals in building evidence-based, data-driven criminal justice strategies that 
combine the expertise of researchers and practitioners for maximum, sustained, and measurable 
impact.”); MARGARET A. GRESSENS & DARYL V. ATKINSON, THE CHALLENGE: EVALUATING INDIGENT 
DEFENSE: NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEMS EVALUATION PROJECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES GUIDE (2012), 
http://www.ncids.org/systems%20evaluation%20project/performancemeasures/PM_guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L864-4RRW]. 
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empirically rather than intuitively derived practice standards, and rigorous program 
evaluation and cost-effectiveness calculations.
15
 
Moreover, and again sharing features in common with the broader evidence-
based movement and other sectors of the criminal justice system,
16
 the call for 
expanded indigent defense data is frequently—though not always, and certainly 
not exclusively—bound up in the above-described quest for enhanced 
accountability.
17
  “Accountability” is frequently cited as a good that is diminished 
by the widespread absence or non-use of data, and concomitantly, enhanced data 
gathering and analysis is cited as a necessary condition for attaining that elusive 
good.
18
  Separately, scholars and leaders within the field tout increased 
                                                                                                                                      
15  See Laurie O. Robinson & Thomas Abt, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice Policy, in 
ADVANCING CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY (Thomas G. Blomberg et al. eds., 2016); 
Smart Suite, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, https://www.bja.gov/Programs/CRPPE/smartsuite.html 
[https://perma.cc/G9WH-Q6PD] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (announcing BJA initiative, of which 
focus on “Smart Defense” is one part, “re-examines every aspect of the criminal justice system to 
identify what is working in the field to reduce crime and recidivism and make our communities 
safer”); MAREA BEEMAN, JUSTICE MGMT. INST., USING DATA TO SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE PUBLIC 
DEFENSE PROGRAMS 14 (2012), http://texaswcl.tamu.edu/reports/2012_JMI_Using_Data_in_Public_
Defense.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VYR-VAG9]; NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING 
REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 44–45 (2011) (observing that 
prevailing caseload standards have no empirical foundation), http://texaswcl.tamu.edu/reports/2011_
Lefstein_Securing_Reasonable_Caseloads.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX3B-DE5A].   
16  See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, USING SCIENCE AS EVIDENCE IN PUBLIC POLICY 21 (Kenneth 
Prewitt et al. eds., 2012) (“Using science in public policy is on the nation’s agenda.  One reason is the 
growing demand for performance measures and enhanced accountability in federal agencies and not-
for-profit organizations.  Another is the call for evidence-based policy and practice, part of a broader 
focus on data-driven decision making across government agencies.”); Daniel P. Mears & J.C. Barnes, 
Toward a Systematic Foundation for Identifying Evidence-based Criminal Justice Sanctions and 
Their Relative Effectiveness, 38 J. OF CRIM. JUST. 702, 702 (2010) (observing that in recent decades 
“the mantra of accountability and evidence-based policy or practice surfaced in nearly all areas of 
government, not least criminal justice” (internal citations omitted)); Espeland & Vannebo, supra note 
4, at 22 (describing increasing tendency for accountability to be quantitatively conceived); 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK 
FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_final
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9CDX-79ES] (urging greater data collection to enhance police 
accountability); Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119 
(2014) (linking increased data with increased law enforcement accountability); Erik Luna, 
Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107 (2000) (arguing that more transparent policing data 
enhances accountability); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 983 (2009) (considering how to give the public, defendants, 
prosecutorial bureaucrats, and others more information to aid “accountability”).   
17  To be sure, some leading voices in the field have heralded the “diversity of functions” that 
emergent data regimes can serve in the indigent defense field, generating capacity not only for calling 
the system or its actors to account, but also for problem diagnosis, policy formulation, and research 
for its own sake.  See, e.g., Andrew L. B. Davies, How Do We “Do Data” in Public Defense?, 78 
ALB. L. REV. 1179, 1185–91 (2015). 
18  See, e.g., Pamela Metzger & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Defending Data, 88 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1057, 1072 (2015) (emphasizing need to “create an accountability mechanism to reduce 
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“accountability” as a rationale for why defender organizations should take up the 
task of developing data collection and analysis regimes.
19
  And among those who 
urge a deeper strategic shift to evidence-based policymaking in the field, 
“accountability” is one oft-cited advantage of generating and rooting decision-
making in data rather than some (less “accountable”) combination of intuition, 
personal and shared experience, and professional judgment.
20
 
But in fact, once one moves beyond the basic intuition that no “accounting” 
can occur if nothing is available to be counted,
21
 the relationship between data and 
accountability becomes less direct than is frequently advanced.  In part, this is a 
consequence of the fact that both terms are too often underspecified.  That is to 
say, accountability can and does encompass a variety of actors, relationships, 
mechanisms, and values in the field of indigent defense.  And defense-related data 
is of many types, generated through different mechanisms, at a range of costs, and 
with variable salience to different audiences.  Once one bears down on the 
multiplicity of accountability types and specifies the varieties of data that might 
facilitate (or inhibit) those accountabilities, the relationship between these two 
concepts of interest emerges as complex and potentially negative. 
This essay aims to illuminate that complexity and potential risks posed by 
data to an indigent defense accountability project.  Specifying the range of data 
that might be generated, and then bearing down on the three basic variables of any 
accountability equation—to whom, by what means, and for what—the essay 
generates four cautionary insights about data and accountability. 
                                                                                                                                                   
practitioner error” and linking data to that goal); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit 
Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L. J. 2626, 2645 (2013) (“Offices should also 
institute accountability mechanisms. . . . [O]ffices should collect data about attorneys’ decisions.  
This data will not only inform attorneys and offices about trends, but will also give offices the ability 
to monitor their attorneys’ judgments.”); SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE INDIGENT DEFENSE 
COMMISSIONS 1 (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_state_indigentdefense_feb07.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Q6ZT-WDZQ] [hereinafter SPANGENBERG COMMISSIONS REPORT]; REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE 7 (June 22, 2012), http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/snyder/Indigent_Defense_Advisory_Comm_Rpt_390212_7.pdf [https://perma.cc/PLT9-
ABZ6]; Remick Complaint, supra note 10, at 16 (alleging that state has left localities to their “own 
devices in providing indigent defense with no obligation to report on . . . activities” and thereby “to 
operate without any accountability or governance”). 
19  See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 15, at 6, 10; Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 18. 
20  GRESSENS & ATKINSON, supra note 14, at 6; TEX. TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEF., 
STRATEGIC PLAN 2010–2015: A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS 1, 3–5, 
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/966/strategicplanfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DYU-PUYY]. 
21  Public administration scholar Mark Bovens makes the point (drawing on the research of 
Melvin Dubnick) that the etymological roots of accountability is rooted in accounting and, literally, 
book-keeping, as in the Domesday Books decreed by William I in order to render a count of 
everything in the king’s realm.  See Mark A. Bovens, Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability 
as a Virtue and as a Mechanism, 33 W. EUR. POL. 946, 950–51 (2010). 
2017] DATA AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIGENT DEFENSE 379 
 
First, there is a risk of a data-accountability trade-off.  Here, I am concerned 
that increasing the capacity for quantitative accountability will not inevitably 
increase, and might decrease, the quality of that accountability, if what is sought is 
improved performance in the field of indigent defense.  This is so in part because 
conditions in the field are ripe for the so-called “accountability paradox” to take 
hold: the likelihood that accountability processes themselves trade off, from a 
resources standpoint, with quality process.  So, for example, a time-pressed public 
defender administrator tasked with monitoring data on defender performance 
might do that in lieu of court monitoring or other time-consuming in-person 
supervision.   
Second, we must confront data-accountability normativity in indigent 
defense.  Advocates or policymakers armed with data about defender activities—
bail results, suppression motion statistics, plea deals, acquittals, sentences, and so 
forth—will still need to resolve tough questions about which activities are 
valuable, and to what degree.  Having in mind, for example, the premise that 
defender organizations armed with statistics might gain leverage with otherwise 
reluctant funders, the normativity of that information should give some pause 
about the magnitude of that leverage.  Simply put, data doesn’t resolve the 
essentially value-laden questions of what makes for a good defense, and how good 
a defense is warranted.   
Third, the essay considers the issue of differential accountability.  Not all data 
will invariably enhance all types of accountability.  For example, granular 
information about the performance of attorneys would enable robust supervisory 
review of defense services, but might be far less interesting or valuable to a 
legislature that holds a public defender to account in budgetary processes.  More 
troubling, it might be that actors will be differently responsive, and systematically 
so, to particular accountability relationships, thereby privileging not only that 
accountability type but also the particular data of greatest salience to it.  Consider, 
for example, that a public defender administrator might be more responsive to the 
accountability she owes to the legislature for running a cost-effective program, 
than she is to the accountability she can generate among her staff.  If this is so, 
granular data collection and analysis might be shortchanged, both to free up time 
and resources to “do” the legislature’s data, and because the more granular analysis 
might reveal trends—say, rigorous motion practice, or routine requests for expert 
assistance—that could become ammunition for political actors hostile to defense 
funding.   
Finally, and relatedly, there is the specter of perverse accountability.  The 
concern here is that the data push is likely not to shore up “accountability” in all 
forms, but rather will elevate certain forms of accountability over others.  Indeed, 
there might be a systematic enhancement of the power of certain accounters—and 
perhaps not those that all data advocates have in mind.  To be sure, advocates 
might well, as they have done to date, successfully wield data to employ the 
machinery of legal accountability that is otherwise unavailable without evidence of 
systemic practices.  On the other hand, data might increase the profile and 
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importance of bureaucratic and political accountability relationships, but less likely 
to shore up accountability roles that might be played by the public generally, by 
clients, or by the defense profession.   
The essay develops these arguments as follows.  Part II drills down on the 
concepts of data and accountability in indigent defense.  It first lays out the types 
and characteristics of information that advocates of more data-driven defense 
policy and practices aim to generate.  It then breaks down the monolithic notion of 
“accountability” in indigent defense.  Part III interrogates the interplays among 
those accountabilities and data.  Part IV discusses implications for these reflections 
on the design of data and accountability regimes. 
 
II. DATA AND ACCOUNTABILITIES IN INDIGENT DEFENSE 
 
Calls for increased gathering, analysis, and use of data in indigent defense cut 
across the extreme heterogeneity of jurisdictions, service delivery systems, and 
challenges that characterize indigent defense in the United States.
22
  In a sense, it 
appears the push for data is the one constant in this highly fragmented sector of the 
criminal justice system.
23
  Perhaps equally prevalent is the linkage of data uptick 
with the enhancement of “accountability” in indigent defense.  But both concepts, 
and the relationship between them, are underspecified.  This part lays descriptive 
groundwork for understanding the varieties of data and accountabilities at play, 
enabling us in Part III to take up questions of interplay. 
 
A. Data 
 
In distilling the types of data that are desired from and for the indigent 
defense system, it is well to begin with what information we have well in hand, 
which until recently has been limited to fairly high-level snapshots of national 
practices.  Studies by private researchers and government entities such as the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics have, for the past four decades, provided a fairly 
reliable but extremely high-level view of national indigent defense practices.  We 
know the range of service provision types—public defender versus assigned 
counsel in various forms—and their distribution among states and localities.24  And 
we know the system’s total volume and gross outcomes—total defense 
expenditures, total number of cases handled, and basic dispositions—and 
                                                                                                                                      
22  See supra notes 11 and 12. 
23  BEEMAN, supra note 15, at 1 (quoting participant in recent ABA Indigent Defense Summit 
as saying that the “key takeaway” from the summit was “the critical importance data plays to 
improve indigent defense”). 
24  See, e.g., Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the 
United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32–47 (1995). 
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variations in the volume and outcomes by jurisdiction.
25
  It’s a portrait that permits 
large-scale comparison, but with little understanding about the meaning of that 
comparison—what, for example, are public defenders or assigned lawyers doing in 
their cases?  Furthermore, the view is at far too high an altitude to reveal 
meaningful information about what goes on in the thousands of individual local 
jurisdictions with autonomy over indigent defense service provision.
26
   
But as one zooms in from this aerial view, the data landscape that comes into 
focus is fairly barren.  The previous paragraph described information that 
essentially can be gleaned from the sort of basic tracking of cases through the 
criminal justice system that is required of court administrators—though even on 
this score, there is a paucity of resources and a significant lack of sophisticated 
infrastructure.
27
  But dedicated accounting for indigent defense services, much less 
making use of that information in system design or service provision is spotty at 
best.  To be sure, as I have detailed elsewhere, there is a small number of 
jurisdictions in the vanguard of a push toward data-driven practice—jurisdictions 
like New York, North Carolina, Texas, and Michigan with organizational 
infrastructure for data gathering and monitoring, and indigent defense 
administrators who are data evangelists in the field.
28
  But the influence of these 
jurisdictions, while significant among thought leaders, has yet to be widely 
realized in the field.
29
  
So what more might we want to know?  Consider first a more robust 
understanding of what is happening in individual representation of indigent 
defendants—not just when an attorney begins and ends working on a case, but also 
the tasks performed in representation, the time spent on those tasks, tasks 
attempted but not attained (for example, an unsuccessful request for funds for 
expert assistance).  At bottom, we’re looking here for the data that would facilitate 
a fuller understanding of what went into the defense product, information that is 
necessary to assess the actual quality of defense services provided (or, in different 
                                                                                                                                      
25  See, e.g., Nadine Frederique et al., What is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent 
Defense Nationwide? A Brief Overview and Suggestions for Future Research, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1317 
(2015); ERINN HERBERMAN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE 
GOVERNMENT INDIGENT DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, FY 2008–2012 – UPDATED (2015), http://www.bjs.
gov/content/pub/pdf/sgide0812.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3R6-NMXD]; DONALD J. FAROLE & LYNN 
LANGTON, COUNTY-BASED AND LOCAL PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007 (2010), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf [https://perma.cc/D242-2U7M]. 
26  See, e.g., SPANGENBERG COMMISSIONS REPORT, supra note 18 (discussing many states that 
permit counties autonomy over administration of indigent defense). 
27  See Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A 
Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221 (2013). 
28  See Laurin, supra note 10. 
29  See, e.g., Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 18, at 1067–69 (discussing dearth of data in the 
field); Wright & Peeples, supra note 27, at 1225–32 (discussing lack of data and evaluation of 
defense performance “by guesswork”). 
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terms, to understand what the funders of indigent defense are getting for their 
money).   
But note that to say that we want to know more about the work going into 
individual representations does not resolve the question of how much more 
knowledge is required.  And given the paucity of the status quo, a wide spectrum 
of commitment to this data project could be fathomed.  At the lowest end of the 
spectrum, simply tracking open cases and dispositions for all attorneys 
representing indigent defendants would enhance contemporaneous data collection, 
and permit real-time monitoring of caseloads.  At the highest end of the spectrum, 
information on all case activities and time spent performing them would fully 
enable a public defender supervisor to know whether attorneys were performing 
tasks commensurate with quality representation—client meetings, investigation, 
and motion practice, for example.  More systemically, workload studies, such as 
those recently carried out in Missouri and Texas, leverage detailed information 
about the tasks actually performed and the time actually required to perform those 
tasks in order to generate empirically grounded standards for attorney case 
capacity.
30
   
By comparison to the aerial first described view, obtaining this ground-level 
information entails devoting more and dearer resources to data generation.  
Critically, even at the lowest end of commitment to this data project, the defense 
lawyer herself will certainly need to be a participant in reporting a detailed account 
of her work.  Attainment of this will in most settings require not only a 
fundamental shift of practice and mindset, but also the siphoning of at least some 
(already pressed) time away from casework in order to create a reliable real-time 
record.
31
  Some monitoring entity—for example an organizational supervisor, or an 
external entity overseeing the performance of assigned counsel—will likely have 
to ensure the regularity and reliability of attorneys’ reporting, not to mention (if the 
project is to have any purpose) review the data itself.  The resources involved in 
instantiating and maintaining this shift toward a data culture cannot be under-
estimated.  Institutional defenders who have implemented time-tracking programs 
consistently characterize them as a “radical cultural shift” in that realm.  Criminal 
defense practice celebrates the maverick, lacks a bureaucratic tradition of 
monitoring individual work product, and indeed typically resists bureaucratic 
                                                                                                                                      
30  See DOTTIE CARMICHAEL ET AL., PUB. POLICY RESEARCH INST., GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT 
DEFENSE CASELOADS: A REPORT TO THE TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION 6, 18–20 (2015), 
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/150122_weightedcl_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HPT-WUH9] 
(explaining importance of granular timekeeping for workload studies); AM. BAR ASS’N, THE 
MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY 
WORKLOAD STANDARDS (2014), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NP8B-BMUV]. 
31  See Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 18, at 1076; BEEMAN, supra note 15, at 15 (reporting 
“41%[] of respondents to our chief defender survey reported that their attorneys track their time”). 
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incursions that could in any way compromise the independent judgment of the 
zealous advocate.
32
  The challenge is all the greater among the substantial ranks of 
solo or small-firm defense lawyers serving as court-appointed counsel in criminal 
cases around the country, where capacity for this type of management, to say 
nothing of the appetite for it, is largely lacking.
33
  Such tasks will compete with a 
host of other obligations, including (optimistically) other modes of supervision, or 
(more likely) other bureaucratic organizational responsibilities.  
To be sure, the work of both attorney and monitor can be greatly facilitated by 
sophisticated case management software (particular when paired with resources 
like laptops for mobile case tracking from court, jails, or investigations in the 
field).  But this is a level of information technology still beyond the grasp of the 
average marginally resourced defender organization (not to mention non-public-
defender appointed counsel); attaining it will require convincing some funding 
source to pony up the cash, and realistically will require prioritizing software over 
something else (another attorney position, funding for training, and so forth).
34
  
Moreover, technological capacity does not entail technological usage, in the face 
of the above-described resource and cultural barriers to learning and using data 
gathering and monitoring systems.  In Knox County, Tennessee, for example, the 
public defender’s office invested in case management software with time tracking 
capacity, but went years without using that capacity, ultimately achieving 
widespread attorney compliance with a time-tracking mandate only through 
significant planning, auditing, and messaging by organizational leadership, along 
with additional capital investment.
35
 
But in all events, building truly “evidence-based practice,” as leading voices 
encourage, would require yet another category of data than all this describes.  The 
promise of evidence-based indigent defense is that policy questions—say, about 
whether to assign counsel from public defender offices or lists of unaffiliated 
attorneys, or whether to require the presence of counsel at initial bail 
determinations (to name just two of many sub-constitutional design decisions 
                                                                                                                                      
32  See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Agenda Setting as a Tactic in Institutional Criminal Defense, 41 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 29, 29, 31–32 (2015) (discussing culture of minimal 
supervision in indigent defense); Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 18, at 1078 (arguing that criminal 
defense “attracts rule-benders, iconoclasts, and revolutionary spirits, all of whom generally resist 
being beholden to a data-driven order.”); Lorelei Laird, The Gideon Revolution, 100 ABA J. 45, 50 
(Jan. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_gideon_revolution [https://perma.cc/78
BC-TM48] (quoting data advocate as reporting that a public defender “‘about fell off the table’ when 
he suggested that her office would start tracking attorneys’ time permanently”). 
33  Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 24, at 32–34. 
34  See Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 18, at 1076–77.  
35  See NAPD Steering Committee, Member Feature: Time Tracking at the Knox County 
Public Defender’s Community Law Office, NAT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. DEF. (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.
publicdefenders.us/blog_home.asp?display=29 [https://perma.cc/YR6Y-HZ99]. 
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susceptible of empirical testing)
36—will be answered on the basis of data, rather 
than intuition, about “what works.”37  It is a two-fold aim: to correlate inputs and 
outputs in indigent defense practice, and to put those correlations to prospective 
use in adopting or rejecting practices.
38
  Thus, for example, a defender organization 
contemplating whether to devote resources to counsel at first appearance will want 
to know more than simply whether attorneys are or are not present at bail hearings, 
but also whether that presence causes better client outcomes across an array of 
potential measures—release, bail amount, dismissal of charges, acquittal, favorable 
sentencing, and so forth.
39
  
To accomplish this, data about practice at the most granular level is a 
necessary condition—to assess the significance of any one input into the 
representation, controlling for all other inputs of potential significance is 
required—but it is not a sufficient one.  Also required are robust data about other 
sectors of the criminal justice system that contribute to defendant outcomes, and 
human and technical resources to do sophisticated statistical analysis.
40
  As the 
leaders of a pioneering foray into evidence-based practice piloted by the North 
Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services (IDS) conceded in the final report on 
their decade-long project to develop and deploy evidence-based outcome measures 
in four indigent defense programs nationwide, “these prerequisites [are] in fact 
                                                                                                                                      
36  See generally TONY FABELO ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’T JUSTICE CTR., IMPROVING 
INDIGENT DEFENSE: EVALUATION OF THE HARRIS COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER (2013), https://www.
prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/Evaluation%20of%20Harris%20County%20TX%20Pub.%
20Defender%20Justice%20Center%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4KU-LF6Z] (comparing cost 
effectiveness of public defender and assigned counsel); UAlbany, New York Office of Indigent Legal 
Services Partner to Improve Legal Counsel for the Underserved, UNIV. AT ALBANY, STATE UNIV. OF 
N.Y. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.albany.edu/news/54018.php [https://perma.cc/BKW7-83TW] (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2017) (detailing grant to study impact of providing counsel at first appearance). 
37  I borrow the phrase from the National Institute of Justice’s optimistically named Internet 
portal, crimesolutions.gov.  About CrimeSolutions.gov, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.crime
solutions.gov/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/RME6-L5PU] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (promising to 
inform as to “what works, what doesn’t, and what’s promising in criminal justice”).   
38  See, e.g., Laurin, supra note 10 (distinguishing granular descriptive statistics from the 
aspirations of evidence-based researchers); North Carolina Systems Evaluation Project (NCSEP), 
N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/SEP
%20HomePage.html?c=Research%20%20and%20%20Reports,%20Systems%20Evaluation%20Proj
ect [https://perma.cc/3UG7-XT5B] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (“We need what other large scale 
systems have: the ability to collect and analyze indicators that measure system performance.  What 
are our outcomes?  How well do we meet the needs of our clients?  If an agency initiates a new 
practice or policy, was the policy successful?  These are questions every indigent defense agency 
should have the tools to answer.”). 
39  See N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEMS EVALUATION 
PROJECT (NCSEP): OPEN SOCIETY FINAL GRANT REPORT 2–14 (2014), http://www.ncids.org/Systems
%20Evaluation%20Project/News_Updates_Products/Final.OSF.GrantReport.pdf. 
40  See id. 
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unobtainable for most indigent defense agencies” today.41  Indeed, the North 
Carolina experience demonstrates the magnitude of the challenges faced in 
developing this type of data even in comparatively well-resourced endeavors.  
Among the four agencies that North Carolina IDS shepherded through its Systems 
Evaluation Project, two were (to date) unable to complete the pilot due to barriers 
to data access and compatibility within their own jurisdictions.
42
  The remaining 
two jurisdictions implemented a robust framework for assessing linkages between 
indigent defense service design or attorney performance and client outcomes, but 
completion of the effort consumed more than two years, even with dedicated 
researchers devoting exclusive resources to the project.
43
  Replication of these 
efforts for other jurisdictions would carry an estimated financial cost of $174,000 a 
year on the low end, or the cost of three new entry-level attorneys.
44
   
 
B. Accountabilities 
 
In considering here the varieties of meaning that accountability does—or 
could—have in the field of indigent defense, the initial step is, predictably, to cabin 
the project.  Accountability is a notoriously diffuse concept as a general 
intellectual matter,
45
 full interrogation of which would require diving deeply into 
philosophy and sociology (consider the range of underpinnings for why an 
accounting is permitted or required
46
), law and political science (consider the 
varied goods or values that could be accounted for
47
), and the various disciplines 
                                                                                                                                      
41  Id. at 19. 
42  Id. at 19. 
43  Id. at 19.  
44  The assertion is based on a combination of totaling low-end figures contained in a sample 
budget for building an in-house research department, assuming the hiring of a dedicated information 
technology director, see NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N & N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., 
TOOLKIT FOR BUILDING IN-HOUSE RESEARCH CAPACITY (2013), http://www.nlada100years.org/sites/
default/files/NLADA%20Toolkit%20-%20Research%20Capacity.pdf [https://perma.cc/UUQ7-G83F], 
and the median starting salary for public defenders in 2014 reported by the National Association for 
Legal Placement, see NALP’s Public Sector & Public Interest Salary Report Turns Ten!, NAT’L 
ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (July 2014), http://www.nalp.org/july14research [https://perma.cc/34
NR-6JYB] (reporting roughly $50,000 median starting salary for public defenders). 
45  See Jonathan GS Koppell, Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN and the Challenge of 
“Multiple Accountabilities Disorder,” 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 94, 94 (1995) (“The lack of clarity 
regarding the meaning of accountability is particularly striking in contemporary popular use.  
President George W. Bush, for example, has said that both elementary schools and countries that 
support terrorism must be held accountable.” (internal citation omitted)). 
46  See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.7 (2000). 
47  See Bovens, supra note 21, at 954–56. 
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that examine institutional design (consider the range of institutional forms that 
could operationalize accountability
48
), among other fields.     
But even without developing a robust and textured account of the nature and 
meaning of accountability in indigent defense, some work can be done to 
problematize a totalizing invocation of the term, to illuminate some of the variation 
in meaning that the term evokes, and to tease out implications of that variation for 
the data project (and vice versa).  Scholars of accountability seem to agree (at 
least) that accountability is, at bottom, “the ability of one actor to demand an 
explanation or justification of another actor for its actions, and to reward or punish 
that second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation.”49  Jerry 
Mashaw concludes that accountability can be distilled to “six basic questions”: 
“[W]ho is accountable to whom; about what; through what process; in accordance 
with what criteria; and with what effects?”50  In what follows, I distill Mashaw 
even further, and begin the task of clarifying “accountability” in indigent defense 
by asking who is accountable to whom, how, and for what. 
Take the first, basic relational question of “who is accountable to whom.”  
The Sixth Amendment itself might suggest an obvious starting point: the 
government is accountable for fulfilling the mandate of the Sixth Amendment—to, 
among other parties, the defendant as holder of the right to the assistance of 
counsel.
51
  Indeed, critics of indigent defense frequently have in mind the unit of 
government responsible for providing the substance of the Sixth Amendment 
guarantee when decrying an accountability deficit.
52
   
Legal, in particular constitutional, doctrine fills in much of the rest of the 
accountability picture here.  The processes by which defendants can hold the 
government accountable for this right are internal to the legal system itself: They 
                                                                                                                                      
48  Jerry Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of 
Governance, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 115 (Michael W. 
Dowdle ed., 2006). 
49  Rubin, supra note 4, at 52; accord Bovens et al., supra note 4, at 2 (“Accounting always 
has a dual meaning: it is about listing and counting important ‘things’—possessions, debts, 
agreements, promises—and about providing an account concerning this count.  Thus it implies telling 
a story, based on some obligation and with some consequence in view.”); Jonathan Fox, The 
Uncertain Relationship Between Transparency and Accountability, 17 DEV. IN PRAC. 663, 664 
(2007). 
50  Mashaw, supra note 48, at 152. 
51  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
52  See, e.g., REPORT OF THE GEORGIA SUPREME COURT INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, supra 
note 5, at 48 (“The State of Georgia lacks a statewide system of accountability and oversight to 
provide constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel for indigent defendants.”); ACLU OF WASH., 
supra note 6, at 5 (“Today, . . . a majority of counties are not held accountable for the quality of trial 
court indigent defense services.”); SMART ON CRIME COAL., supra note 6, at 81 (calling for 
“[a]ccountability for [v]iolations of [i]ndividual [l]iberty by [s]tate and [l]ocal [g]overnment”); TEX. 
APPLESEED FAIR DEF. PROJECT, supra note 6, at 43 (criticizing lack of county accountability for 
quality of indigent defense). 
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can assert the right as a defense to prosecution where the government’s obligation 
is breached, and they can (with considerably more difficulty inhering in 
constitutional doctrine and justiciability requirements) affirmatively litigate the 
right in a civil action.
53
  As for the criteria against which the government will be 
judged, federal constitutional law sets a minimum threshold—counsel must be 
provided in all felonies and misdemeanors for which imprisonment is imposed, 
and counsel must be “effective” as Strickland v. Washington and its progeny define 
the term.
54
  State law sometimes exceeds this lower bound, but as with federal law 
it provides substantive guidance that is both highly general and relatively 
minimal.
55
  As a result, the “effect” of this type of accountability will typically be 
circumscribed: If a lawyer has been erroneously denied, one can be provided, or a 
conviction can be reversed, or some combination thereof.   
But while constitutional doctrine has been highly consequential in setting 
basic policy priorities in indigent defense—creating what some have dubbed 
“unfunded mandates” to supply counsel in a judicially specified category of 
cases—this form of accountability does little to dictate the details of lawyers are 
provided to the poor, or even, for that matter, to catch instances where defendants 
receive less than their constitutional entitlement.
56
  On the other hand, it is clear 
that the threat of being held to legal account is a stick to which at least some 
governmental units are responsive, as when the specter of reversed criminal 
convictions or civil liability extracts funding concessions from otherwise reluctant 
legislatures.
57
  And increasingly, legal accountability in the form of structural 
                                                                                                                                      
53  See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 427 (2009); Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: 
Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 680–85 (2007).  This 
limitation holds at least insofar as we treat defendants as a distinct category of accounters.  
Defendants qua citizens can wield other tools, including in particular political, i.e., electoral, 
responses.  See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 48, at 121. 
54  Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
55  See, e.g., Jan Lucas, A Cumulative Approach to Ineffective Assistance: New York’s 
Requirement That Counsel’s Cumulative Efforts Amount to Meaningful Representation, 28 TOURO L. 
REV. 1073, 1086 (2012) (listing states that depart from Strickland). 
56  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L. J. 2676, 2685 (2013) 
(arguing that “the promise of Gideon [has] been so poorly realized” due to “interrelated phenomena” 
of Supreme Court’s imposition of “unfunded mandate on state and local governments with the only 
realistic enforcement mechanism being the finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in individual 
cases,” and the Court’s creation of ineffectiveness test “that makes it very difficult for a convicted 
individual to get relief, even when counsel’s performance is quite deficient”); Janet Moore, The 
Antidemocratic Sixth Amendment, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1705, 1714–15 (2016) (citing “wide agreement” 
that the Court’s ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine itself “contributes to the indigent defense 
crisis with abysmally low constitutional standards for defense attorney performance”).   
57  See, e.g., Kurt Erickson, Missouri Budget Could Help Ease Pressure on Public Defender 
System, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 6, 2016), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-
politics/missouri-budget-could-help-ease-pressure-on-public-defender-system/article_42e616c3-
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reform litigation is shifting the playing field in jurisdictions where widespread, 
structural deficiencies in the provision of competent defense counsel render the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee utterly illusory.  To connect this to our other variable 
of interest, data has played a critical role here, permitting plaintiffs to demonstrate 
statistically the pervasiveness of deficiencies as well as the likelihood of counsel’s 
ineffectiveness given caseloads and other burdens, and thereby to overcome 
significant hurdles to creating class actions, proving constitutional violations, and 
obtaining injunctive relief.
58
   
Defendants, however, are not the only actors in the indigent defense realm 
with an accountability relationship to the government, and legal mechanisms of 
enforcing that relationship are not the only type.  So even sticking with the state as 
the “who” in the accountability relationship, other “to whom” candidates might be 
posited—say, the public generally, which has a democratically grounded interest in 
holding government “accountable” for its performance obligations, constitutional 
and otherwise.
59
  Indeed, the oft-made connection between the tenuous political 
foothold for indigent defense and perennial under-resourcing of the field 
essentially depicts a deficit in this form of accountability.
60
  And if an 
                                                                                                                                                   
6f92-5981-a7f2-14bd37f993dc.html [https://perma.cc/BD7R-XAF6] (quoting legislator and former 
prosecutor concerned that without funding increase convictions will be thrown out);  Eli Hagar, Why 
Getting Sued Could Be the Best Thing to Happen to New Orleans’ Public Defenders, MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/01/28/why-getting-sued-could-be-
the-best-thing-to-happen-to-new-orleans-public-defenders#.fWTNOi7uB [https://perma.cc/Q45Q-JL
NT] (speculating that threat of civil liability will spur action). 
58  See, e.g., Drinan, supra note 53, at 432; BEEMAN, supra note 11, at 22; Stipulation and 
Order of Settlement, Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, No. 8866-07, at 5–14 (Oct. 21, 2014),  
https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Hurrell-Harring%20Final%20Settlement%20102114.pdf [https://perma.
cc/68FL-ZNJR] (memorializing agreement to settle indigent defense suit in exchange for counsel at 
arraignment, caseload standards, monitoring, and other improvements to provision of counsel in New 
York); Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 718, 720–25 (Pa. 2016) (holding that “a cause of action 
exists entitling a class of indigent criminal defendants to allege prospective, systemic violations of the 
right to counsel due to underfunding, and to seek and obtain an injunction forcing a county to provide 
adequate funding to a public defender’s office” and relying on data documenting caseloads and 
staffing). 
59  There are yet other accounters here, of course.  For example, units of government directly 
responsible for providing indigent defense—say, a public defender office—could hold (and have 
held) the funding jurisdiction accountable for resource decisions by refusing to accept more cases.  
See, e.g., Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability and Ethics: Reconsidering the Relationship, 6 INT’L J. 
ORG. THEORY & BEHAV. 405, 410–11 (2003); Ben Meyers, Orleans Public Defender’s Office to 
Begin Refusing Serious Felony Cases Tuesday, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.nola.
com/crime/index.ssf/2016/01/orleans_public_defenders_to_be.html [https://perma.cc/YFD6-TVW5]; 
Erik Eckholm, Public Defenders Push Back Against Budget Cuts, S.F. GATE (Nov. 9, 2008), 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Public-defenders-push-back-against-budget-cuts-3186194.php 
[https://perma.cc/856F-W69X]. 
60  See Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public 
Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1079, 1091 (1993); Michael Barrett, Using Caseload Standards, Time Logs, and Other Tools to 
Get Public Defender Funding, NAT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. DEF.: BLOG (June 3, 2016), http://www.
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accountability deficit does exist on this score, its sources could be several, 
depending upon (among other factors) the answers to Mashaw’s questions here.  
For example, the break-down might be that the mechanism of accountability is an 
electoral one, but the people apt to vote on the issue of indigent defense are either 
too small in total number or too marginalized from the democratic process to 
broadcast that preference.  It could be that criteria by which the public assesses 
lawmakers’ job performance in this arena are not what they should be, for example 
if the voters’ bottom line (or what lawmakers’ think is the voters’ bottom line) is 
cost over system performance.  Or it could be that the voters are poorly informed 
about how official decision-making is affecting the provision of counsel to the 
poor.   
These various potential sources of deficiency in this accountability type have 
obviously distinct implications for solutions, including but not limited to the 
potential for data to be ameliorative.  For example, advocates for improvements to 
indigent defense typically envision that data will empower their efforts by 
enhancing the political pressure on intransigent funders faced, in a data-rich world, 
with incontrovertible evidence that budgetary levels make the provision of 
competent counsel to all indigent defendants practically impossible.
61
  
Unquestionably, this is one potential way in which data will intervene in these 
political accountability relationships, but, as Part III will explore, it is not the only 
one.    
Accountability for indigent defense might aim closer to the ground, though, in 
the sense of oversight of what indigent defense services are being provided.  In the 
individual case, other actors in the adversary system might themselves play roles 
as accounters.  This is exemplified by an accountability relationship that is all-too-
common in states and, indeed, in the federal system, wherein defense lawyers are 
selected and appointed by the judges before whom they practice.  As David Patton 
describes in a call for greater independence for appointed counsel in federal 
criminal cases, judges routinely hold defenders accountable for responsible use of 
public funds by, for example, rationing resources for processing discovery or 
obtaining case experts.
62
  It is an arrangement that raises serious concerns about 
defender independence; it arguably provides the wrong answers to Mashaw’s six 
                                                                                                                                                   
publicdefenders.us/blog_home.asp?display=19 [https://perma.cc/P87G-5RKC].  Thoughtful scholars 
have persuasively made the case, though, that assessing political support for defense funding is 
probably more complicated than other areas of criminal law legislation.  See Darryl K. Brown, 
Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 923–24 (2010) (exploring political 
preferences that might generate varying, commonly low, popular support for indigent defense 
funding); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice 
Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 259–62 (2004).  
61  See BEEMAN, supra note 15, at 5; Laurin, supra note 10, at 361. 
62  David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal Public Defense: A Call for Independence, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 335, 368–72 (2017). 
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questions; but those concerns do not lessen the extent to which an accountability 
dynamic is at work. 
More robust accountability might emerge various bureaucratic regimes that 
exist in indigent defense.  Thus, an individual lawyer in a public defender office is 
in some way and in varying degrees accountable to supervisors within the office.  
The office might, in turn, be accountable to some an outside oversight entity.  Or, a 
bureaucratic oversight entity might have the capacity to hold accountable 
institutional and individual defenders alike, as in a state like Michigan that lacks a 
statewide public defender but has created a statewide indigent defense commission 
to “ensure the state’s public defense system is fair, cost-effective and constitutional 
while simultaneously protecting public safety and accountability.”63  The 
American Bar Association’s standards for defense practice envision that 
accountability of this sort will exist, calling for defense lawyers to be “supervised 
and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally and 
locally adopted standards.”64  And it is a deficit in this type of accountability that is 
frequently invoked in criticisms of the fragmented nature of indigent defense, 
provision of which is sometimes the responsibility of an organizational entity, but 
frequently carried out by autonomous assigned counsel with little monitoring.
65
 
Mashaw’s “six basic questions” might be, and are, answered in various 
additional ways.  There are political accountability levers, as where legislatures 
directly monitor the functioning of a statewide public defender, typically through 
the appropriations process.
66
  Still another potential accounter is, of course, the 
client him- or herself, though both constitutional doctrine and design choices in 
indigent defense limit the avenues for individuals to evaluate counsel.
67
  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                      
63  MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, http://michiganidc.gov [https://perma.cc/G5KN-CU46] (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
64  AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1 (2002), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid
_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD9D-KNFD]. 
65  See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 1769, 1799–1800 (2015) (bemoaning lack of oversight of lawyers); Metzger & 
Ferguson, supra note 18, at 1072 (emphasizing need to “create an accountability mechanism to 
reduce practitioner error”); NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, A STRATEGIC PLAN TO ENSURE 
ACCOUNTABILITY & PROTECT FAIRNESS IN LOUISIANA’S CRIMINAL COURTS (2006), http://www.nlada.
net/sites/default/files/la_strategicplantoensureaccountabilityjseri09-2006_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
75U5-6TNT] (urging adoption of standards and compliance program); TEX. APPLESEED FAIR DEF. 
PROJECT, supra note 6, at 43; COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., FINAL REPORT TO 
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 34 (2006), http://nycourts.gov/ip/indigentdefense-
commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf [https://perma.cc/27Z5-8NYP]. 
66  See, e.g., COLO. STATE PUB. DEF., FISCAL YEAR 2016–17 BUDGET REQUEST (2015), 
http://www.coloradodefenders.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/fy17-ospd-budget-submission.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PE5R-96VJ] (reporting office performance in connection with budget submission to 
legislature).   
67  See Janet Moore et. al., Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense and the Struggle for 
Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1287 (2015); JONATHAN E. GRADESS, PUBLIC 
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one push in indigent defense reform has been to invigorate this form of 
accountability through market mechanisms, as seen in the indigent defense 
voucher initiative pushed by scholars including Stephen Schulhofer, and recently 
piloted in Comal County, Texas.
68
  Finally, more radically horizontal 
accountability might be generated among defense lawyers.  Eve Brensike Primus 
has written recently of the great need for public defender offices to shore up their 
“group structure” as a way of improving defense culture, and mechanisms for 
doing so include group strategy sessions and other avenues for peer feedback.
69
   
As the preceding discussion intimated, in addition to variety in the parties to 
and mechanisms of an accountability relationship, the criteria by which a provider 
of indigent defense services might be held to account will also be varied.  Those 
criteria will likely vary depending on, among other circumstances, the identity of 
the accounter, its institutional incentives, and its normative outlook.
70
  Among 
critics of the field, the presumptively appropriate criterion is typically quality of 
representation, defined by reference to standards of practice and the like.  But a 
legislative body or other funding gatekeeper is likely to have additional (or 
alternative) criteria in mind, including the types of cost and public safety 
implications that are more widely shared across the electorate.  Thus, for example, 
the North Carolina legislature in 2013 enacted requirements that the state’s 
indigent defense commission, in awarding contracts for defense services, “consider 
the cost-effectiveness of the proposed contract.”71  A public defender bureaucrat, 
by contrast, might be expected by virtue of professional affinity and ethical 
obligation to channel a more single-minded focus on representation quality in an 
accountability relationship, though the centrality of that priority can certainly be 
mediated by pressure created through other accountability relationships, e.g., 
between the organization and the legislature or other external oversight agency.
72
  
It is presumably this sort of mediation that legislatures are aiming for when they 
discipline public defense administrators for prioritizing advocacy over cost—as 
when the Legal Aid Society of Onondaga County, New York lost its indigent 
defense contract after a legislative committee questioned its volume of motion 
                                                                                                                                                   
DEFENSE AT THE CROSSROADS: LISTENING TO THE VOICE OF CLIENTS (2003), http://www.nysba.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=49278 [https://perma.cc/3M2X-7KFH]. 
68  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and 
Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505, 508–10 (2015); see also Moore, supra note 56, at 1729.  
69  Primus, supra note 65, at 1792–93. 
70  See Mashaw, supra note 48, at 155–56 (discussing normative concerns in accountability 
design); MICH. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, supra note 63. 
71  See Introduction to Requests for Proposals and Contracts, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. 
SERVS., http://ncids.org/RFP [https://perma.cc/J5U6-K3LV] (last updated Aug. 31, 2016). 
72  Lorelei Laird, When Public Defenders Become Plaintiffs, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2017), http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/when_public_defenders_become_plaintiffs [https://perma.cc/
42RA-6QMJ] (noting that public defenders are disinclined to take legal action to obtain more funding 
because “they’re exposed to politically motivated firings, budget cuts, and more”). 
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practice and discovery requests.
73
  Indeed, the oft-cited need for defender 
independence can be understood as a mirror image of the accountability deficit, a 
problem of misplaced or over-accountability.
74
 
Again, the account here is gestural rather than exhaustive.  But it suffices to 
make the central point, which is that in indigent defense, as elsewhere, 
accountability is multi-faceted and multiple.
75
  And with that understanding, we are 
far better positioned to assess the impact that data in its many varieties might have 
on the accountability landscape, and vice versa.  It is to that task that the next part 
of this essay turns. 
 
III. THE DATA-ACCOUNTABILITY INTERPLAY 
 
There are a number of reasons why it might be a good idea to “do data” in 
indigent defense.
76
  We might think that data-driven decision-making is typically 
going to yield higher quality policies than reasoning from experience or intuition.  
We might believe that with a literal accounting of what defenders do (or don’t do), 
advocates for indigent defense can make the case for more funding or for legal 
liability to legislatures and courts, respectively.  We might think that indigent 
defense providers in a democracy have an obligation to be transparent in their 
operations.  But whatever the premise about the value of enhanced data capacity in 
the field, the very logic of embracing data calls for careful scrutiny of claims in its 
favor.  As an increasing number of states and the Department of Justice’s grant-
making infrastructure climb aboard the data train, it is well to ask more critical 
questions about what those efforts are likely to yield.
77
  Particularly ripe for 
questioning are unqualified assertions that data will “bring accountability . . . to the 
defense function.”78  This part names and explores four perverse dynamics that 
                                                                                                                                      
73  See Primus, supra note 65, at 1790–91; see also Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 
173 (3d Cir. 2015) (reinstating lawsuit alleging county fired public defender in retaliation for efforts 
to obtain more funding); Julie Bykowicz & Tricia Bishop, Top Maryland Public Defender is Fired, 
BALT. SUN (Aug. 22, 2009), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-08-22/news/0908210179_1_
forster-public-defender-outsource [https://perma.cc/CVB5-734P] (detailing firing of chief public 
defender in aftermath of request that agency growth rate be curbed).  
74  See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1069 (2006); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL 80–84 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/139.pdf [https://perma.
cc/G67S-RLB6]; cf. Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 185, 203 (2014).   
75  Cf. Koppell, supra note 45, at 99.  
76  See generally Davies, supra note 17. 
77  See supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text. 
78  See Dawn Deaner, 2014 in Review: Ending Excessive Workloads, NAT’L ASS’N FOR PUB. 
DEF. (Apr. 9, 2015), http://96.5.71.27/?q=node/756 [https://perma.cc/EW9R-63PY]; TEX. FAIR DEF. 
PROJECT, BENEFITS OF A PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICE: INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COST 
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might emerge in the data-accountability relationship.  The part concludes with 
thoughts about how, with eyes open, these risks might be mitigated. 
 
A. The Data-Accountability Trade-off 
 
Consider first the possibility that more tools in the arsenal of an accountability 
relationship will not actually enhance the quality of its accounting, if the task is 
understood to be aimed at improving the provision of indigent defense.  In part, the 
concern rests on the fact that conditions in the indigent defense field are ripe for 
the so-called “accountability paradox” to arise: There is an almost inevitable trade-
off between accountability and performance, since “reporting, mitigating, and 
reframing demand attention and consume the energy and time of the account 
giver—thereby using resources that would otherwise be devoted to the more 
desired forms of performance.”79  In the resource-constrained world of indigent 
defense, triage is virtually always the order of the day; tracking time, or reviewing 
the fruits of that tracking, is virtually guaranteed either to siphon resources from 
other tasks, or to tax the capacity of over-extended actors.
80
   
Without fully exploring potential manifestations of the trade-off problem, we 
can gain purchase on the concern by reconsidering the impact of expanding 
granular, case-level knowledge about what defense services are being provided on 
lawyer accountability.  There is an obvious accountability function for such 
information, vis-à-vis individual defenders.  A public defender organization with 
real-time data about the work being done by its attorneys has the ability to 
continuously monitor workloads and the quality of representation by tracking the 
indicators created by the lawyers themselves.
81
  But will these expanded tools truly 
enhance the accountability of those lawyers in the sense of identifying and 
ameliorating low-quality representation?  It almost certainly will if the alternative 
is next-to-zero monitoring and evaluation—a condition of unfortunate 
prevalence.
82
  But the answer is less clear if data-driven supervision trades off with 
                                                                                                                                                   
EFFECTIVENESS IN HARRIS COUNTY’S INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM 1 (2009), http://www.fairdefense.org/
wp-content/uploads/media/TFDP-Harris-County-PD-White-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6SK-ZX9A] 
(arguing that public defender and concomitant data capacity will achieve better accountability of 
defenders as well as the system to the taxpayers); see also BEEMAN, supra note 11, at 18–23 
(suggesting that identical data will enhance internal bureaucratic accountability, political 
accountability, and legal accountability, among other types).  
79  Melvin Dubnick, Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of the 
Mechanisms, 28 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 376, 396 (2005).   
80  See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) (“[D]efense lawyers’ most important job is triage: deciding which 
(few) cases to contest somewhat, which (very few) cases to contest seriously, and which ones not to 
contest at all.”); Barrett, supra note 60. 
81  See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 15, at 3–4; Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 18, at 1097–98. 
82  See Primus, supra note 65, at 1775. 
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other forms that supervision might take—review of hearing and trial transcripts, 
court visits, shadowing, and so forth.
83
  Perhaps ideally, supervisors would want a 
multi-textured portrait of lawyer performance, gleaned both from quantitative data 
about performance indicators like motions filed, investigative hours logged, and 
dismissals won, as well as a qualitative indicia.  But in a world of limited 
resources, it is more likely to be zero sum.
84
  The trade-off risk is exacerbated by 
the possibility that data-driven supervision will be more appealing than the 
alternatives.   Reviewing case management reports can be done at any time, 
remotely, and relatively quickly, in contrast to file checks, transcript review, and 
other more labor intensive techniques. 
Furthermore, there are reasons to think that the trade-off, if it occurred, would 
be deleterious.  It seems likely that at least some attorneys can “improve their 
numbers” without actually improving performance.85  Even assuming no shirking, 
here are attributes of good lawyering that data indicators are unlikely to capture—a 
lawyer’s rapport with clients or their families, a lawyer’s skill in jury selection.  
And there are arguably psychological (and, as a result, performance-related) gains 
from the act of non-data-driven supervision itself.  In a profession in which a 
surfeit of autonomy and a deficit of collaborative work habits is widely thought to 
contribute to poor performance and burn-out, refashioning workplace 
accountability through mechanisms that require less rather than more interpersonal 
engagement risks exacerbating toxicity within the work environment.
86
 
I hasten to admit that there might seem something too banal to the observation 
that tasks take resources, that actors must find those resources, and that if new 
resources aren’t created old ones will be consumed to get the job done.  But 
indigent defense, like few other operations—to say nothing of other 
constitutionally protected operations—is a perennially resource-strapped field.87  
Calls for enhancing the data profile of indigent defense in order to, among other 
ends, increase quality and secure greater and more stable funding must confront 
the (however obvious) chicken-and-egg problem that flows from adding to 
defenders’ to-do lists. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
83  See Primus, supra note 65, at 1816–17. 
84  See Metzger & Ferguson, supra note 18, at 1072; cf. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information 
Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1430 (2011) (“The main benefit of 
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85  Cf. Arie Halachmi, Accountability Overloads, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 560 (Mark Bovens et al. eds., 2014). 
86  See Primus, supra note 65. 
87  See Brown, supra note 60, at 908; Mayeux, supra note 3, at 24. 
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B. Data-Accountability Normativity 
 
Data doesn’t speak for itself—at least not when pressed into use in context, 
much less the politically contested context of indigent defense.
88
  As the previous 
part observed, the criteria by which anyone should be held to “account” in the 
context of indigent defense is normatively contestable—even among defenders 
themselves.  Thus, to evaluate the quality of a public defender’s work, one must 
determine, among other things, what to value, and how to rank a range of 
outcomes.  How, for example, does a case in which a client was incarcerated 
pretrial and ultimately entered a plea for a lower-than-market prison term compare 
to a case in which a client obtained pretrial release and was convicted at trial but 
won a pretrial suppression motion?  The permutations of that question are nearly 
endless, and certainly not unanswerable, but they are highly contestable.  
Moreover, they point to the risk that data (at least as currently conceived) might 
not capture characteristics for which defenders should be held accountable: How, 
for example, should client satisfaction, or the client’s family’s satisfaction, be 
measured and factored into the quality equation?  Again, this is not an intractable 
problem, but it is one that can be missed if decisionmaking starts with data rather 
than with values. 
Shifting the focus to the normative perspective of external actors only 
heightens the normative conflict, and points to a different set of stakes.  
Constitutional law sets a low bar for indigent defense quality, and commits to the 
political process decisions about the extent to which a system will exceed that 
bar.
89
  Data can depict how a system is performing, but cannot resolve the question 
of whether that performance is good enough.   
Consider in this light the accountability dynamics between funding entities 
and indigent defense providers.  Proponents of more data-driven defense 
commonly argue that defender organizations that rigorously track how attorneys 
spend their time and what outcomes they achieve will be better armed to insulate 
defense programs against legislative cost-cutting tendencies.  As the head of 
Missouri’s statewide public defender described in touting the advantages of robust 
time tracking in his own office,  
 
No longer do I have to speculate or use anecdote to describe to 
legislators how many hours a public defender spends waiting in court 
because judges give private attorneys priority, or the percentage of an 
attorney’s time spent opening and closing files.  Ask a fiscally 
conscientious legislator if they think taxpayers should pay an attorney to 
                                                                                                                                      
88  See generally Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 
YALE L.J. 165 (1999). 
89  See Stuntz, supra note 80, at 70. 
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sit in court for hours and then end their day performing ministerial tasks 
that support staff can do for less?
90
   
 
The argument is, in essence, that data will create more functional accountability 
processes by demonstrating the affirmative link between certain expenditures and 
objective measures of defense services quality.  Undoubtedly, that is one possible 
outcome, and anecdotal accounts bear out the possibility; the Missouri public 
defender, armed with an elaborate, first-of-its-kind empirically based caseload 
study, convinced the legislature to extend the “largest increase in appropriations 
for the Missouri State Public Defender Commission in 15 years.”91  But significant 
counter-examples exist: North Carolina’s unusually rigorous program of data 
collection and analysis has not spared indigent defense from the legislature’s 
budgetary hatchet.
92
  Indeed, the Missouri victory was short-lived.  The state’s 
democratic governor vetoed the funding bill, and the public defender has remained 
severely hobbled and locked in a pitched political battle ever since.
93
  
This is unsurprising.  Data, even high quality data demonstrating, for 
example, precisely how many new attorney positions are required to spend 
adequate time defending cases, cannot by its own force cut through the essentially 
normative concerns about how much to value lawyers for poor defendants, and 
how to rank lawyers for poor defendants in the list of priorities a legislature 
necessarily has.  Ideally, data would permit a defense organization to demonstrate 
convincingly that requested budget levels are a win-win.  Advocates have argued 
that empirical studies demonstrating the benefits of providing counsel at bail 
hearings are of precisely this character, documenting liberty gains to represented 
defendants and cost savings to counties through reduced jail populations.
94
  But 
                                                                                                                                      
90  Barrett, supra note 60; see also NAPD Steering Committee, supra note 35 (“When the time 
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frequently the case is likely to be mixed: Defense programs need more than what 
the legislature would authorize if unconstrained by Sixth Amendment obligations, 
and whether what’s purchased is an adequate defense or an excessive defense will 
be in the eye of the beholder.
95
  Indeed, accountability conflicts will only be made 
more vivid, rather than resolved, by the data.  Imagine a legislature armed with 
data concerning the precise menu of programs or services defenders can offer 
under given budget conditions, now more able to weigh in with its own views 
about the relative priorities of those offerings. 
 
C. Differential Accountability 
 
A distinct concern arises from the range of accountability types that seem less 
likely to be enhanced, and perhaps even likely diminished, by centering the 
production and analysis of indigent defense data.  By way of example, consider 
government’s accountability to the general public for fulfillment of the legal 
obligation to provide adequately for indigent defense; lawyers’ accountability to 
their indigent clients for the provision of adequate (indeed zealous) advocacy; and 
defenders’ mutual accountability to their colleagues for adequate professional 
performance.  These three types are noteworthy in three respects.  First, it is fair to 
say that all three are currently weak (and in some cases non-existent) 
accountability mechanisms in the field: lack of public interest in and support for 
defenders, marginalization and alienation of indigent clients, and widespread 
absence of supportive professional environments are all cited as pervasive 
characteristics of indigent defense practice.
96
  Second, stakeholders within and 
observers of the field have made repeated and compelling arguments that shoring 
up these accountability relationships would meaningfully enhance the quality of 
indigent defense.
97
  And third, these are accountability types in which enhancement 
of the indigent defense data profile is likely to have low impact.   
To make the last point is not to argue that more robust and contextualized 
information about the quantity and quality of indigent defense is theoretically 
irrelevant to the public, or to clients, or to colleagues.  One could imagine a world 
in which the public directly, or through the work of knowledge brokers like non-
                                                                                                                                                   
(2015), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RTC-DINAL_3.18.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4H3Z-NQVK]. 
95  See Primus supra note 65, at 1790–91 (discussing conflict over public defender resource 
allocations); cf. Halachmi, supra note 85, at 562–63 (discussing how institutional context affects 
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96  See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st 
Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 87 (1995); Primus, supra note 65, at 1772–78. 
97  See Jonathan A. Rapping, Directing the Winds of Change: Using Organizational Culture to 
Reform Indigent Defense, 9 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 177, 205 (2008); Robin Steinberg & David Feige, 
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profits or the media, consumed vastly more detailed information about the work 
that their taxpayer dollars funded.  A project funded by a Department of Justice 
grant to develop a publicly accessible portal for the enormous volume of county-
level data maintained by the Texas Indigent Defense Commission has this among 
other aspirations.
98
  Or, in Comal County, Texas, where indigent defendants are 
now voting with their feet about the quality of lawyers by choosing where to spend 
county-provided defense vouchers, we can suppose that real-time public data about 
lawyers’ caseloads would meaningfully inform prospective client decision-
making.
99
 
But it is not too cynical to suggest that the above hypothetical scenarios are 
not the most likely.  This is not simply about making the demonstrably true point 
that individuals who lack special incentive and expertise to consume indigent 
defense data are unlikely to endeavor to do so.
100
  At a minimum, bringing data to 
stakeholders outside the inner circle of attorneys, administrators, and governmental 
funders will require additional effort—in publicity, in development of data 
presentation infrastructure, in contextualization of raw data—above and beyond 
what would be necessary to render the data operative in other accountability 
relationships.
101
  In other words, public, client, and professional accountabilities 
will have to be independently prioritized and valued over and above the likely 
more immediate pull of supervisory and legislative accountability.
102
   
But more to the point, more detailed, more robust, information about what 
defenders do and the effect of that work on client outcomes seems, actually, not to 
be the most important missing ingredient in these now neglected accountability 
relationships.  The public’s dim view of the value of work done by lawyers for 
indigent defendants is a product of a clash of values, the fact that an indigent 
defendant client’s interest in zealous advocacy can have negative externalities (if, 
for example, the defendant is guilty), and simple prejudice at least as much as a 
misunderstanding about the nature and impact of the work.  For clients to be able 
to hold lawyers accountable, they need meaningful opportunities to collaboratively 
communicate within the representation relationship, and to express feedback 
outside that relationship, not more information about their lawyer’s work.  More 
robust horizontal professional accountability will be achieved through 
                                                                                                                                      
98  See Texas, SMART DEF., http://smartdefenseinitiative.org/initiative-site/texas [https://perma.
cc/WDJ4-BB3Q] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017) (detailing grant-funded project to “develop a data driven 
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99  See Schulhofer, supra note 68. 
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opportunities for collaborative work, outlets for peer brainstorming and feedback, 
not organization-wide review of performance statistics.  Were the pursuit of data-
driven accountability to distract or detract from such efforts, indigent defense 
would miss opportunities to meaningfully improve culture and practice within the 
field. 
 
D. Perverse Accountability 
 
Closely related to concerns about differential accountability is the risk that 
data might render actors in indigent defense too responsive to certain 
accountability relationships, resulting in a perversion of accountability.  Barbara 
Romzek and Melvin Dubnick discussed a relevant species of this type of problem 
in their seminal case study of the Challenger disaster, in which they attributed 
many of the errors that contributed to that accident to “the inappropriateness of the 
political and bureaucratic accountability mechanisms” to the technical decisions 
NASA faced in relation to the Challenger launch; “if the professional  
accountability system had been given at least equal weight in the decision-making 
process, the decision to  launch would probably not have been made on that cold 
January morning.”103  Moreover, and perhaps more tragically, Romzek and 
Dubnick observed that the outsized responsiveness that NASA exhibited to 
political and bureaucratic accounters (who pushed for the Challenger launch with 
ignorance or unsophisticated understanding of the technical risks) was not 
irrational, but rather a predictable organizational response to budgetary pressures 
and the need to cultivate ongoing political support for the agency’s space shuttle 
program.
104
 
The broader point is that actors in multiple, simultaneous accountability 
relationships—a quality that characterizes most if not all actors in indigent 
defense—might not give uniform weight to those roles.  Consider the significance 
of this insight for just one potential accountee, an administrator of indigent defense 
services, perhaps (as in many but far from all jurisdictions) a chief public defender.  
A common account of the role that data will play in that actor’s accountability 
relationships is that developing an ongoing, granular understanding of the work of 
lawyers within the agency will lift all boats, simultaneously enhancing the ability 
to effectively supervise within the organization, and facilitating answerability to 
the legislature and other political actors, while also supplying the necessary 
informational capacity to invoke legal accountability mechanisms—i.e., suit by 
clients denied the right to counsel—if governmental funders are intransigent.105  
But when one considers the spectrum of data-gathering rigor discussed in Part 
                                                                                                                                      
103  Barbara S. Romzek & Melvin J. Dubnick, Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons 
from the Challenger Tragedy, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 227, 235–36 (1987). 
104  Id. at 231. 
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II.A., as well as the resources that will be required for defense organizations to 
develop a reliable, robust data program, triage seems a more likely scenario.  And 
the data that is likely to grease the wheels of a budgetary accountability 
relationship is likely to be higher-level than the information an administrator 
would need to meaningfully supervise attorney work. 
On the flip side, it is possible that pressures of accountability will suppress 
the enthusiasm of indigent defense administrators to collect granular data, if access 
to and review of that data by accounters who do not prioritize zealous defense 
would render the organization politically vulnerable.
106
  Put differently, there is a 
risk that the very data that would be valuable to enhance accountability of 
defenders to supervisors for quality performance, might also be used by judges 
who have a role in appointing counsel, or legislatures who have a role in funding 
counsel, to check, control, and ration resources to defenders. 
To a large extent, these observations illuminate that accountability in indigent 
defense has a double-edged quality, to the extent that accountability relationships 
can impinge upon the independence that is ethically, indeed legally, required of 
defense counsel.
107
  This is a tension that can and must be managed with good 
institutional design, a matter to which the next part turns.  But the point for present 
purposes is that data can feed into this vulnerability at least as readily as it can 
ameliorate it.  
 
E. Reflections on Design 
 
The previous part sounded largely cautionary notes.  The intent is not to reject 
the aspiration of a more data-rich indigent defense field, but rather to be clear-
headed about predictions for the upsides of that turn, and also to put in clear view 
potential—but not inevitable—downsides.  Among other benefits from the 
endeavor is to permit more deliberate design choices in fashioning both data 
regimes and accountability structures, to mitigate or avoid such risks.  In that vein, 
there is a distinct advantage to the still-low data profile of the field, in that many 
design questions are still open, and hence capable of attending to the dynamics 
discussed above.  Without mapping a precise course forward, this part suggests 
some priorities and frames for those important deliberations. 
The first agenda item that flows from the observations of this essay is for 
practitioners and scholars to attend more than we have to precisely what forms of 
accountability are ideal and attainable in indigent defense.  This is not a 
conversation that is occurring, at least not explicitly.  States’ increasing interest in 
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the last decade in creating forms of independent, external oversight of indigent 
defense has obvious implications for this issue, but has been little studied.  
Discussions of optimal service design, which typically focus on a false binary 
choice between public defenders and assigned counsel, tend to center on which 
designs will generate superior client outcomes, and to a lesser extent on which 
designs better preserve lawyer independence.
108
  These are important but not 
exhaustive concerns in evaluating potential accountability regimes.  Thoughtful 
evaluation of the empirical and normative concerns here would include asking not 
only what accountability forms will generate quality, but also what will generate 
legitimacy—for the public and for users of the system.  It would reflect on lesser-
discussed ingredients of quality that point toward particular accountability 
mechanisms, such as defenders’ need for a positive professional culture with 
formal and informal opportunities for attorney mentoring.
109
  It would consider the 
importance (and meaning) of democratic values in the provision of indigent 
defense.
110
  And it would deliberate on the utility and perils of multiple 
accountability regimes in this arena.  Indeed, there are undoubtedly yet more 
questions that should frame the inquiry.  But it is well to take it up in a systematic 
rather than secondary or accidental manner.     
A second and related call, one that has been sounded in other fields that have 
taken up the data mantle, is to attend to measuring what is valued rather than 
valuing what is measured.
111
  Expanding the role of data in understanding, 
monitoring, and holding accountable indigent defense practice will have the likely 
effect of reifying the knowable, of reinforcing and recreating the elements of the 
field that are evaluated.
112
  But there are valuable features of indigent defense 
practice with important accountability implications that are either less susceptible 
of measurement than others, or that are less easily identified by the type of real-
time task-tracking that is typically associated with high quality data programs—
client satisfaction, public legitimacy, and attorney satisfaction, to name just a few 
discussed in this essay.  This suggests either cabining the role of data, or thinking 
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creatively about how to gather this information in a form as readily trackable and 
comparable as other data.  The latter effort was part of the ambitious Systems 
Evaluation Project spearheaded by the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense 
Services, which incorporated client satisfaction into its system measures; similar 
efforts have been undertaken by other indigent defense programs, but it is fair to 
say this remains the vanguard.
113
  The point here is that measuring such 
intangibles, if they are indeed valued, should be seen as part of the basic data 
project, not extra-credit.  
A third and final observation to frame the current and future design 
conversations is that for reasons discussed in this essay, data is likely to make the 
perpetual concern about independence of the defense function more rather than 
less acute.  Any metric that can be used by a chief public defender or indigent 
defense commission to ensure attorney performance is high when measured against 
standards of zealous defense, can also be used by a funding entity aiming to ration 
defense services, or an appointing entity aiming as much for efficient case process 
as high quality individual defense.  Thus, a jurisdiction that enhances gathering and 
use of data to monitor attorney performance, but locates that monitoring function 
at least in part with an entity that is not evaluating exclusively for quality in 
representation, may well exacerbate rather than ameliorate accountability and 
independence concerns.   
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Data is here in indigent defense.  That is a development that is almost 
certainly, on balance, for the best.  But, the data project might also have 
unintended consequences, or fall short in some of its promise.  This essay has 
illuminated that when it comes to data as an accountability-generating device, the 
picture may be more mixed than predictions to date have stated.  The answer, of 
course, is not to abandon the enterprise, but to think systematically about the risks 
of shortfall and aim to account for those risks in designing data and accountability 
systems in the field.  At bottom, this essay is an invitation for the project to be 
undertaken in earnest. 
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